Protection of database under actionable torts by Nazura Abdul Manap,
                                                                                                                                     
1 
 
Protection Of Database Under Actionable Torts 
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ABSTRACT 
The need for legal protection for database is derived mainly from the universal 
problem of piracy. Database piracy has for years become a threat to database 
producers, primarily because of its nature of “easily susceptible for copying”. 
Advances in digital technology have facilitated the creation of databases. The 
technology makes possible for a large amount of data to be created and converted to a  
digital form. The same technology used in increasing the value of database, may also 
permit quick and easy reproduction of those databases or substantial portion of the 
data contained in it. This encourages the act of “free riding”. In the event that 
copyright, contract and self-help technical devices fail to repress wholesale copying, 
the law of actionable torts would suffice to prohibit the free riding activities of 
database, including parasitical or market-destroying business practices. In Malaysia, 
the courts should be willing to apply tortious principles in appropriate database 
cases. This would be a viable alternative to heavy-handed intellectual property 
legislation. 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Keperluan melindungi pangkalan data sebahagian besarnya disebabkan oleh masalah 
cetak rompak. Cetak rompak pangkalan data telah menjadi ancaman kepada 
pengeluar pangkalan data sejak sekian lamanya kerana sifatnya yang “sangat mudah 
ditiru”. Perkembangan teknologi digital sangat membantu dalam penciptaan sesuatu 
pangkalan data. Ia membolehkan sejumlah data yang banyak dicipta dan ditukarkan 
kepada  bentuk digital. Teknologi yang diguna pakai bagi menambah nilai kepada 
sesuatu pangkalan data juga digunakan bagi membuat penyalinan yang pantas dan  
mudah terhadap pangkalan data tersebut atau sebahagian besar daripada data di 
dalamnya. Ini menggalakkan perbuatan “penunggangan percuma”. Dalam keadaan 
mana hak cipta, kontrak dan peralatan bantuan teknikal gagal untuk membendung 
peniruan secara berleluasa ini, undang-undang tindakan torts membantu dalam 
melarang perbuatan salah laku ini, termasuklah amalan perniagaan secara parasit 
dan memusnahkan pasaran ini. Di Malaysia, mahkamah perlu bersedia mengguna 
pakai prinsip-prinsip torts dalam kes-kes yang melibatkan pangkalan data. Ini 
merupakan satu alternatif yang berupaya membantu meringankan bebanan 
penggunaan undang-undang harta intelek. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The doctrine of unfair competition has been formulated in international treaties1  and 
applicable in certain countries.2
 
DATABASE: THE DEFINITIONS 
 
 However, some jurisdictions either refuse to accept 
this doctrine or remain silent on the matter. In common law countries, for instance, 
there is no such legal principle as tort of unfair competition. However, in that system, 
the liability for an act of unfair competition is derived from the application of general 
tort principles to regulate various types of market behaviour. This tortious protection 
is determined by judges through their decisions in courts. In that respect, this article 
analyzes the protection of database under the common law actionable torts. The 
discussion is divided into two relevant areas of torts, and they are, trespass to chattel 
or goods and unjust enrichment. The law of trespass to chattel is examined to ensure 
the application of its traditional elements in protecting sophisticated databases. The 
doctrine of unjust enrichment, alternatively, is evaluated to study the application of the 
law in protecting unjustified interference with database.  
Database is described as “quantity of data available for use, which is stored in a 
computer in a way that enables people to get information out of it very quickly”.3 It is 
also described as collection of data produced and retrieved by computer. The data is 
usually stored on magnetic disk or tape. A database program enables the computer to 
generate files or data and later search for and retrieve specific items or groups of 
items. For example, a library database system can list on screen, all the books on a 
particular subject and can then display further details of any selected book.4
                                               
1  Internationally, the protection against unfair competition is found in three main international bodies 
that are the Paris Convention, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs 
Agreement) and the WIPO Model Provisions on Protection against Unfair Competition. 
2  There are countries which have a specific legislation or statute for that purpose (which is also known 
as Lex Specialis approach). This form of unfair competition law can generally be divided into two; 
first, countries with specific legislation, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Peru, Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.  Secondly, the principles 
develop from specific provisions within broad statutes. The examples are Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Columbia, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Rumania and Venezuela. World Intellectual Property 
Organization (1994), Document on Protection against Unfair Competition, Geneva, WIPO 
Publication No. 725(E). 
3  Collins Cobuild: English Language Dictionary, Collins Publisher, 1987, pg. 357. 
4  Philip’s Encyclopedia Comprehensive Edition, George Philip Ltd., 2002, pg. 266. 
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Normally and strictly, a database is a body of information held within a 
computer system using the facilities of a database management system. All accessing 
and updating of the information will be via the facilities provided by the software as 
will be recording of information on the log file, database discovery and multi-access 
control.5
Following the Database Directive, the United Kingdom’s Copyright Design 
and Patent Act 1988
 
 The above definitions seem to confine the meaning of database to electronic or 
computer database. However, it is an acceptable fact that a database can include a 
physical database which is non electronic in nature. A technical definition of database 
is significant in determining the legal protection of database. This is because the 
process of selection and arrangement of data in the database may raise a question of 
copyright protection. 
Useful guidance can be sought from definitions offered in legal instruments. 
One statutory definition can be found in the European Database Directive. Article 1(2) 
of the Directive provides: 
 
…”database” shall mean a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a 
systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means. 
 
6
                                               
5  Oxford Dictionary of Computing, Oxford University Press, 4th Edn., 1996, pg. 119. 
6  The Copyright Design and Patent Act 1988 was amended through Copyright and Rights in Database 
Regulations 1997 to comply with the European Council Directive On The Legal Protection Of 
Database (Directive 96/9) on March 11, 1996 (O.J. L77/20). 
 defines “database” in section 3A(1) as follows: 
 
…”database” means a collection of independent works, data or other materials which – (a) are arranged 
in a systematic or methodical way, and (b) are individually accessible by electronic or other means. 
 
The term “database” is thus a term with no precise definition. At its most generic, a 
database might be described as an “organized collection of data”, which is probably, 
but not necessarily, electronic in nature. Because these electronic collections have 
become so familiar, however, the term has expanded beyond its purely technical 
meaning. 
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TRESPASS TO CHATTEL/ GOODS  
The doctrine of trespass to chattel or goods has traditionally existed where there is 
unauthorized interference with, or use of personal property. Despite its traditional 
applicability, database owners have begun to assert trespass to chattels or goods 
claims as a basis for protecting databases and proprietary computer systems.7
 
  
The Definitions 
“Trespass” has been defined as a tangible interference with property, requiring 
physical contact with the property as a threshold matter.8
The term “chattel” is defined in a law dictionary as “… an item of personal 
property which is movable, as distinguished from real property (land and 
improvements)…”,
 The concept of “trespass to 
chattel” or “trespass to goods”, despite literally carrying the same or similar meaning, 
is in fact, interpreted and classified quite differently in different jurisdictions. Trespass 
to chattel is a legal doctrine that has been applied in the United States particularly, if 
the relevant case is under the state’s jurisdiction. Meanwhile, trespass to goods is a 
common law doctrine, which is applicable in the United Kingdom as well as in other 
commonwealth countries, including Malaysia. 
9 while  the word  “goods” is interpreted as “… an item held for 
sale in the regular course of business, as in a retail store …”10 These two have 
something in common, in that they refer to a valuable item or property, or also known 
as personal property, which is defined as a physical, and a tangible property differing 
from both real property and intellectual property law.11
                                               
7  This new sub-set of claims, which has also been referred to as “cyber-trespass” focuses on whether 
someone is authorized to access the database, the means used to circumvent that authorization and the 
level of approved access .See Corey W. Roush, ‘Database legislation: changing technologies require 
revised law’ 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 269, 288. See also Edward W. Chang, ‘Bidding on trespass: eBay 
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and the abuse of trespass theory in cyber-space law’ (2001) 29 AIPLA Q. J. 
445 at 449. 
8  Laura Quilter, ‘The continuing expansion of cyberspace trespass to chattels’ 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
421 at 17.  
 
9  http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?selected=181&bold=|||| (11 Nov. 2004). 
10  http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?selected=820&bold=|||| (11Nov. 2004). 
11  Laura Quilter, The continuing expansion of cyberspace trespass to chattels, pg. 424-425. 
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In the United States, according to § 217 Restatement (Second) of  Torts12 “… a  
trespass to chattel may be committed intentionally by (a) dispossession another of the 
chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another”. On 
the other hand, trespass to goods is defined as “… a wrongful, direct (and not 
consequential) or negligent interference with goods in claimant’s possession at the 
time of interference. Absence of intent is generally an excuse …”13 In other words 
‘trespass to goods’ refers to a wrongful and direct interference with goods that are in 
the possession of another.14 It is also defined as committing, without lawful 
justification, any act of direct interference with a goods in the possession of another 
person which amounts to possible injury.15
In conclusion, ‘trespass to chattel’
 
16
A database which consists of information is considered as ‘property’ as the 
definition of ‘property’ in today’s information age has expanded to include services 
and intangibles.
 or ‘trespass to goods’ is a torts’ cause of 
action that is based on intentional interference to a property that in the possession of 
another person.  
17  Property is normally referred to as a bundle of rights recognized in 
law in reference to a particular subject matter.18 It also consists of the bundle of 
privileges, powers and rights that law recognizes with respect to particular subject 
matter.19 Since a database generally consists of information, the relevant property 
rights include copyright,20 the use right,21 the disclosure right,22 the integrity right,23 
the transmission right24 and the access right.25
                                               
12 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (1965). Although many state trespass laws mirror the   
Restatement, the Restatement is not a mandatory authority followed by courts. However, the courts 
do find its analysis persuasive. Clifton Merrell, Trespass to chattels in the age of the internet, 80 
Wash.U.L.Q. 675 at note 24. 
13   Wilkinson v. Downtown [1897] 2 QB 57 at 426. 
14   Norchaya Talib, Law of torts in Malaysia, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2nd Edn., 2003, pg. 47. 
15  R.F.V. Heuston,  Salmond on the law  of torts, Sweet & Maxwell, 16th Edn., pg. 93. 
16  Trespass to chattels  claim is also referred to as the tort of conversion’s little brother. In Thrifty-Tel,  
Inc v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App.1996). 
17  Raymond T. Nimmer, ‘Intellectual property is still property’ (1990) 13 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 108.  
18  Raymond T. Nimmer, ‘New Property Rights and E-Commerce’, 697 PLI/Pat  9  at 12-13. 
19  Raymond T. Nimmer, ‘New Property Rights and E-Commerce’, pg. 12. 
20  Ibid., The right to reproduce the information in copies. pg. 13. 
21  Ibid., The right to use the information for internal purposes . Ibid. 
22  Ibid., The right to disclose the information or not to do so.   
23  Ibid., The right to  ensure the information will not be altered or destroyed without consent.   
24  Ibid., The right to regulate electronic distribution of the information.   
25  Ibid., The.right to   control access to information known to the owner.  
 These rights arise in many different 
bodies of law and one of the relevant laws is the law of tort of trespass to chattel.  
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The Application of Trespass to Chattel / Goods Legal Doctrines to Database  
A principle of trespass to chattels or goods is obviously applicable to an act of 
intruding into a physical database as this doctrine was initially developed to protect 
physical property.26 However, it is acceptable that this doctrine is used to prevent the 
unauthorized use of electronic database27 and Internet databases, in the form of 
websites and online databases. It is submitted that websites are likely to constitute 
database as they exist as a result of the systematic and methodical characteristics in 
the underlying data.28
The act of trespassing the Internet database is committed through first, the 
unauthorized use of Internet software robots and secondly, via method of deep linking. 
A software robot is a program used by one website to search, copy and retrieve 
information from another website.
 Online database, on the other hand, is specifically invented to 
enable the user of the Internet to access to information or data contained on the 
database while they stay online.  
29 This automated web spider communicates across 
the Internet to index or collect information about another site in a lightning speed, 
retrieve large amounts of data in seconds, and can potentially clogg-up network 
connection to servers and even the server itself.30 This technology causes spam31
                                               
26  Laura Quilter, ‘The continuing expansion of cyberspace trespass to chattels’ pg.  421. 
27  Electronic or digital database exists in the form of CD ROM. 
28  Ida Madieha Abdul Ghani Azmi, ‘Creepy crawlies and trespass to chattels: non copyright means to 
protect proprietary data in cyberspace’ [2004] 2 MLJ  x.  See also Lorna Brazell, ‘Protection of 
websites by database law’ [2002] Nov Copyright Law 15. 
29  In  eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d pg. 1060,   a robot is a software program that executes 
commands at 1,000 lines a minute  when retrieving textual information on the Internet.  This 
software robot can be used in varieties of ways by a malicious website owner which includes 
program to scour a website for email addresses, then send junk mails to those email addresses within 
a couple of hours, see David Kramer and Jay Monahan, ‘Panel discussion: to bot or not to bot: the 
implications of spidering’ (2000) 22 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 241 at 242. However this software 
robot can also be used in a beneficial way, for example search engines often use web spiders, 
crawlers or robots to seek out websites, catalog relevant information, repackage and supply the 
information to Internet users. Some examples of this search engine using software robots are 
Yahoo!, Ata Vista, Lycos and Googles. 
 
30  John D. Saba, Jr,  ‘Internet property rights: e-trespass’ 33 St Mary’s L.J. 367 at 370. See also Troy 
Wolverton, ‘EBay, bidders edge  face off in court’, CNET News.com at 
http://www.Canada.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-1697820. html 
31  Spam is the term used to described unsolicited email. In Compuserve v. Cyber Promotions, 962 
F.Supp. at 1018 n.1, it is stated that “[T]his term is derived from a skit performed on the British 
television show Monty Python’s Flying Circus, in which the word “spam” is repeated to the point of 
absurdity in a restaurant menu…” Spam creates a two fold problem. First, users complain because 
their email inboxes are full of messages in which they are not interested. Ibid.,at 1023. Sometimes 
these messages are explicit in nature, which includes advertising pornographic sites, further 
compounding the anger of Internet Service Provider (ISP) users. Second, the large number of 
messages forces the ISPs’ server to devote greater time to routing these messages and storing them 
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activities, whereby the promoters and advertising companies send enormous amounts 
of unsolicited bulk emails to Internet Service Providers32 and their users. Spam result 
in customer (Internet users) complaints, monopolize valuable server time and can slow 
down connection speeds which will delay the users’ access to the site.33 In eBay, Inc . 
v Bidder’s Edge, Inc,.34
The second method, deep-linking occurs when one website publishes a 
hypertext link deep in the interior of another website’s homepage.
 the Judge in that case extended the spamming case law to 
protect a database owner from diminished server capacity caused by repeated, 
unauthorized intrusions by bots (robotic software) used to locate, retrieve, copy and 
aggregate data . 
35 Deep linking 
bypasses a website’s homepage, which generally contains important advertisements, 
advertising banners and other important information, and provides path deep into the 
interior of the website. Due to these problems of unauthorized use of software robot 
and unsolicited deep linking, it is vital for the website owners to establish clear 
property rights36 in order to ensure that Internet sites are only accessed in a proper 
manner. A well-defined right would give website owners the power to control access 
to their sites. This would protect them against harmful and unfair Internet practices. 
While the idea of trespass does not establish rights to prevent further copying as a 
matter of property law, it does provide a basis, in addition to contract, to control 
access to the content of database.37
                                                                                                                                       
on the server. This processes decreases bandwith. The decrease in bandwith causes the users of ISP 
like Compuserve to experience slower transfer rates of data, making the Internet appear sluggish. 
Consequently, users not only complain about unwanted messages which sometimes are offensive in 
nature, but also slower transfer rates. Ibid., at 1022.  
32 A company that provides its customers with access to the Internet, typically through dial up 
networking. Usually, the customer pays a monthly fee, and the Internet Service Provider supply 
software that enables the customer to connect to the Internet by modem. See Douglas Downing, 
Dictionary of computer and internet terms, 6th Edn., 1998, pg. 240.  Major Internet Service 
Providers in the United States include Microsoft, Netcom and Mindspring, America Online, 
Compuserve and Prodigy. In Malaysia Jaring and TMNet are the pioneers of Internet Service 
Provider’s activities. 
33  R.Clifton Merrell, ‘Trespass to chattels in the age of the Internet’ 80 Wash. U.L.Q. 675 at 676. 
34  100 F.Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D.Cal.2000). 
35  Deep linking involves providing a link not to the home page of the targeted site, but to a specific 
interior page on the site that provides a service. This method can be very beneficial because it allows 
an Internet user to drill down to the  exact information sought within a website without having to 
scour the whole site. Kurt A.Wimmer, E-litigation, [2000] May 29 Nat’L L.J. pg. A17. 
36  In the case of  eBay v. Bidder’s Edge,100 F. Supp. 2d at 1058, it is indicated that treating a web 
server as property  grants owners an exclusionary right, thereby increasing value. 
37  Raymond T. Nimmer, ‘New property rights and e-commerce’ 697 PLI/Pat 9, April-May 2002, pg. 
14. 
   Thus, it is submitted that the doctrine of trespass 
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to chattel or goods is the appropriate legal mechanism to protect website or database 
owners’ right.38
The Threshold of Protection
 
 
39
Trespass to Chattel in the United States 
 
The threshold of trespass to chattel doctrine can be derived from § 217 and  § 218 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. § 217 requires that the act must involve a physical 
contact with chattel40. Even though the word “physical contact” does not appear in the 
section, the term “intermeddling” indicates the act of intentionally bringing about a 
physical contact with the chattel.41 This element plus the requirements in § 218 
develop the threshold in a trespass to chattel claim.42
i. the act involves physical contact; 
  
Based on the § 217 and § 218, it is submitted that a trespass to chattel action is 
established in a situation where a person intentionally and without authorization 
interferes with or dispossesses other person’s chattel which cause harm to the owner 
of the chattel.  
Thus, the requirements of a trespass to chattel claim are as follows: 
ii. dispossession of another of the chattel  where the possessor is deprived 
of the use of the chattel for a substantial  time; and 
iii. harm where the chattel is impaired  as to its condition, quality or 
value. 
 
                                               
38  John D. Saba, Jr, ‘Internet property rights: e-trespass’  pg.  371. 
39 This part will deal with the requirements of a trespass to chattel in the United States jurisdiction and 
trespass to goods as exemplified in the common law countries such as  the United Kingdom and 
Malaysia. 
40 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217, a trespass to chattel is defined as “… 
intentionally dispossessing another of the chattel or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the 
possession of another.” 
41  Restatement (Second) of Torts  § 217 cmt. (e) (1965). 
42 §218 provides that: 
 “…One who commits a trespass to a chattel may be committed intentionally by: 
 (a) dispossession another of the chattel, or; 
 (b) the chattel is impaired  as to its condition, quality or value, or; 
 (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial  time, or; 
 (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing 
in which the possessor has a legally protected interest…” 
     A claimant is required to satisfy any of the elements provided in that section. 
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i. 
Trespass to chattel usually entails physical contact or interference with the owner’s 
use and enjoyment of his or her property. “Physical contact” connotes that a tangible 
interference must be involved. A strict interpretation of “physical contact” would not 
cover the act of extracting data or information from a digital database without 
authorization as it does not concern tangible subject matter. Thus, the doctrine of 
trespass to chattels has been extended to a digital or Internet database based on the 
assumption that electronic signals or transmissions are sufficiently tangible to support 
a trespass to chattels claims.
Physical Contact or Interference 
43 In other words, the application of trespass to chattel 
doctrine has considerably been expanded by case law, from a tort involving physical 
contact to a tort involving the momentary touching of electrons. 44 This approach was 
first introduced in Thrifty-Tel, Inc v. Bezenek, 45 where computer technology was used 
to crack the plaintiff’s access and authorization codes and long distance calls were 
made without paying for them.46 The Court believed that  the 1,300 phone calls in a 
seven hour period generated electronic signals sufficiently tangible to support a 
verdict on trespass to chattels.47 The Court also found that  the physical contact  of the 
electrons with the phone equipment satisfied the physical contact element of the tort. 
His Honour further explained that “[A]t early common law, trespass required a 
physical touching of another’s chattel or entry onto another’s land…” 48
                                               
43  Please see  Thrifty-Tel, Inc v. Bezenek 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App.1996)  and CompuServe, 
Inc v. Cyber Promotions 962 F.Supp.1015 (S.D.Ohio 1997). 
44  The Court noted that  the courts have substantially loosened  the physical touching requirement for 
trespass to chattels over the years to include  indirect touching of  dust particles from a cement plant 
that migrate onto real and personal property. 
45  54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App.1996). 
46  The defendant’s children made ninety calls, consuming twenty-four minutes of telephone time on the 
first two random telephone days, in an attempt to enter random telephone access numbers. By using a 
computer program, they were able to generate 1300 phone calls entering random strings of numbers in 
a six to seven hours period. As Thrifty-Tel was a small carrier, the defendant’s children action had 
overburdened the system and denied some subscribers access to phone lines. Ibid., pg.  472. 
47  The California Court of Appeals refused to rule on the conversion issue. The court expressly stated 
that it did not need to resolve whether intangible computer access codes can be the basis of a 
conversion suit. Traditionally, the loss of an intangible property interest could only be a basis for a 
claim of conversion if that interest is tied to something tangible that could be physically taken, see 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P. 2d  479 (Cal. 1990). For example, a tangible 
stock certificate represents an intangible property interest in a company. See also Payne v. Elliot, 54 
Cal. 339, 3429 Cal.1880), holding that, the shares of stock are the property involved and not the actual 
certificates. The Courts generally do not recognize this as conversion as the unauthorized taking of 
intangible property is not merged with something tangible. The court decided not to rule on whether the 
storage of intangible access numbers in something tangible, like a computer disk or a piece of paper, 
would be sufficient merger of the intangible with the tangible to give rise to a conversion claim. Ibid. 
48  Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6. 
 The court’s 
conclusion that the electronic signals sent over   the computer and phone lines was a 
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sufficient physical contact element of trespass was based on the finding that 
microscopic particles49 or smoke50
 The court in the Southern District of Ohio in CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions,
  that touched real property was considered as 
having physical contact.  
51 citing Thrifty-Tel, affirmed that   electronic computer  signals sent as 
spam to CompuServe were sufficiently tangible  to satisfy the elements of a trespass to 
chattels claim.52 The court stated that “ [T]he value of that equipment to CompuServe 
was diminished even though it was not physically damaged by defendant’s 
conduct…”53
The expansion of the element of “physical contact” to include electronic 
signals sent from one computer server to another was expressly supported by Judge 
Hupp in Ticketmaster v. Ticketmaster.com
 It indicates that the element of physical damage is not compulsory to 
satisfy as long as the chattel i.e., the equipment, is impaired as to its condition, value 
and quality. 
54
If the electronic impulses can do damage to the computer or to its function in a comparable way to 
taking a hammer to a piece of machinery, then it is no stretch to  recognize that damage as trespass to 
chattels and provide a legal remedy for it.
 where he explained that: 
 
55
In the case of eBay v. Bidder’s Edge,
 
 
56
                                               
49  See Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining, 709 P.2d 782, 790 (Wash. 1985) .This case held 
that microscopic particles from copper smelter could give rise to trespass to land claim. 
50  See Ream v. Keen, 838 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Or. 1992). This case held that smoke from a neighbouring 
field could give rise to trespass to land claim. 
51  962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). This case extended the doctrine of trespass to chattels into the 
area of unsolicited bulk email. Cyber promotions sent spam emails to CompuServe users. 
CompuServe initially tried to stop the problem both by notifying  Cyber Promotions that its emails 
were unauthorized and by filtering the messages using the headers and return address information. 
However, Cyber Promotions ignored the notification and easily bypassed the filters by falsifying the 
point of origin information contained  in the header of the message which concealed their origin. 
962 F.Supp.1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) at 1017-1019. 
52  Ibid., pg. 1017. 
53  Ibid., pg. 1022.  
54  200 WL 525390,  2001 US App Lexis 1454. Ticketmaster filed suit in Federal District Court in 
California against Tickets.Com for using unsolicited hyperlinks to the interior of Ticketmaster’s 
home page.Tickets.Com  provided tickets to specific events via website. In the event that 
Tickets.Com was not able to provide tickets for a specific event, Tickets.Com posted a link to the 
interior of Ticketmaster’s event page, thereby bypassing the home page to prevent Tickets.Com 
from allowing customers to deep link through its backdoor. Ticketmaster sued Tickets.Com under 
ten different causes of action, including the claim of trespass. The court, however, dismissed the 
bulk of those claims, including the trespass action. The court was obviously not ready to ban deep 
linking on a trespass claim. 
55  Ibid. 
 the court used the trespass to chattel 
theory to create a stopgap remedy to protect on line databases. Prior to eBay, it was 
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submitted that the trespass to chattel theory was primarily used to prevent parties from 
swamping online service users with unsolicited commercial email messages.57
 The most recent case involving cyber-trespass to database is  Register.com Inc. 
v Verio, Inc.,
 
58 where the Southern District Court of New York granted a preliminary 
injunction based on plaintiff’s  trespass to chattels claim even though the plaintiff  
could not show that it had suffered any tangible harm to its chattel, i.e.,  the WHOIS 
database.59 The element of physical contact was not further elaborated.60
 From the above cases, it seems the traditional notion of trespass to chattel,
  
61
                                                                                                                                       
56  100 F Supp 2d 1058 (N D California, May 24, 2000), eBay entered into an agreement with Bidder’s 
Edge to allow Bidder’s Edge’s software robot to crawl through eBay website for ninety days. 
Bidder’s Edge’s software robot was designed to automatically poll that eBay website and index 
most of eBay’s auction products and pricing. After the ninety day contract ended, however, eBay 
and Bidder’s Edge failed to reach a licensing agreement. E Bay gave sufficient notice to Bidder’s 
Edge that further use of any software robot constituted trespass and would not be tolerated. At first 
Bidder’s Edge abided by eBay’s instructions, but when Bidder’s Edge learned that other companies 
were continuing to loot eBay’s website web site information with their own software robots, 
Bidder’s Edge resumed the crawling. In an effort to refute Bidder’s Edge’s practice, eBay attempted 
to physically block the defendant from their web site, but failed. After eBay had exhausted all its 
options, eBay brought action against Bidder’s Edge under a claim of trespass to chattels. At 1061-
1063. 
57  Edward W. Chang, Bidding On Trespass :eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. And The Abuse Of 
Trespass Theory In Cyberspace Law 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445 at 446.   See the example in  CompuServe 
Inc v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F.Supp 1015. 
58  126 F.Supp. 2d.238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
59  This WHOIS database contains the names and contact information such as postal address, telephone 
number and email address for customers who register domain names through the Registrar. 
60  The defendant used a search robot to access the WHOIS database maintained by the accredited 
registrars, including Register.com, and collected information from customers who had recently 
registered a domain name and then used that information to contact and solicit Register.com’s 
customers by email, regular mail and telephone. As a result of defendant’s actions, Register.com 
received numerous complaints about the email and telephone solicitations by Verio from its 
customers and co-brand partners. This WHOIS database contains the names and contact information 
such as postal address, telephone number and email address for customers who register domain 
names through the registrar. 
61  To support the trespass to chattels claim, the court reasoned that although trespass to chattels once 
required strict proof of physical interference, proving such elements is not as strict in the modern 
trespass doctrine. See Thrifty –Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d at 472. See also John D.Saba, Jr, ‘Internet 
Property Rights: E-Trespass’ pg. 374. 
 
which conditions “something in a tangible form” has been stretched to cover chattel, 
which is intangible in nature, such as digital data and electronic signals. Even though 
in the real space context, trespass to chattel usually entails physical interference or 
interruption with the owner’s use and enjoyment of his property, in cyberspace there is 
no physical dispossession, it only involves intermingling with electronic transmission. 
Therefore, the trespass to chattel claims has been applied in the case of unauthorized 
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use of online or digital database based on the assumption that electronic signals are 
sufficiently tangible to support a trespass to chattel cause of action.62
ii. 
 
 
Dispossession Of Another Chattel / Substantial Interference 63
 This element was brought up by the defendant in CompuServe, Inc v. Cyber 
Promotions,
 
64 to assert that the plaintiff’s trespass to chattels claim was not supported 
because the defendant’s email actions did not dispossess CompuServe of its property. 
It was contended by the defendant that substantial interference with the chattel is 
required in a trespass to chattels claim.65 The defendant supported his contention by 
referring to case law66, which indicated that the requirement of substantial interference 
is required in a trespass to chattel claim. However, even though the Court seemed to 
agree with the defendant’s argument, it stated that other tortious actions exist under 
the restatement to sustain a trespass claim.67
 In eBay, Inc. v Bidder’s Edge, Inc.,
 
68
                                               
62  eBay, 100 F.Supp.2d at 1069. 
63 § 218 (a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a person may commit trespass to chattel 
intentionally if he dispossess another of the chattel. The requirement will be discussed together 
with § 218 (c) that is “the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time” or 
also known as substantial interference of the use of the chattel. This is because a chattel can only 
be dispossessed if a substantial interference involved in the use of the chattels by the owner. 
64   962 F.Supp.1015 (S.D.Ohio 1997). 
65   Ibid., pg. 1022. 
66  Ibid. The defendant cited  Glidden v. Szybiak, 63 A.2d 233, 235 (N.H. 1949) which stated that 
because plaintiff did not contend any harm done by defendant pulling on her pet’s ears, no tortuous 
action could be brought. Another case referred to by the defendant is  Koepnick v. Sears Roebuck 
& Co., 762 P.2d 609, 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) where it was held that a vehicular search 
amounting to two minutes is not sufficient dispossession. 
67  The list of possible intentional conducts which may amount to trespass to chattel  is listed in § 218 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts such as the act of dispossession of another’s chattel and the 
act of harming or impairing the chattel. These conducts are not required to co-exist, it is sufficient 
if one of  the conducts committed as the conjunction “or” instead of “and” were used in the  
Restatements . 
68  100 F.Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D.Cal.2000). 
 the presiding Judge ruled that to establish 
trespass to chattels, “intermeddling with  or use of another’s personal property” rather 
than “a substantial interference with possession” was all that was required. This 
indicates again that only one element is needed to establish trespass to chattel. 
However, the Judge further stated that there was some uncertainty as to the precise 
degree of possessory interference required to constitute intermeddling. In other words, 
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the Court was of a view that, the interference must be substantial, the degree of 
deprivation from the chattel was not made clear by the Court.69
 It was submitted that the element of substantial interference or deprivation of 
the use of the chattel for a substantial period of time would appear to restrict the 
application of this tort to cases of physical vandalism.
 
70 The extent of application of 
“physical property” to electronic signals would not assist in establishing that there is 
substantial interference with electrons. As a matter of fact, some courts have 
confirmed the trespass to chattel claims on the basis of relatively minor amounts of 
interference;71 this is to include electrons flowing through a system originating from 
spam emails which caused inconvenience to plaintiff’s customers.72 This indicates 
that the level of substantiality required has not been determined by the court in 
ascertaining the level of interference involved in a trespass to chattel claims. This is 
due to the fact that in most of these cases, the plaintiffs are more concerned with the 
defendants making unauthorized invasion into plaintiff’s system to gain some kind of 
commercial advantage.73
 In Ticketmaster v. Ticketmaster.com,
  
74 the comparative use of ticketmaster’s 
website by Tickets.com was very minimal which has not shown that Tickets.com’s 
use interferes with the regular business of Ticketmaster.75
                                               
69  The copying undertaken by Bidder’s Edge caused injury to eBay. Bidder’s Edge bots had visited 
eBay’s site approximately 100,000 per day, accounting for as much as 1.53% of the total requests 
received by eBay and as much as 1.10% of the total data transferred  by it over the web.  
70  Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Mixed metaphors in cyberspace: property in information and information 
Systems 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J 235, 242. 
71   CompuServe Inc. v Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.Supp.1015,1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997).  
72  Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Mixed metaphors in cyberspace: property in information and information’ 
systems’  pg. 242. 
 The finding seems to 
suggest that in order to determine whether or not there is a trespass to chattel, the 
amount of interference must be substantial. 
73  Ibid., at note 43. Examples include a situation where the defendant makes unauthorized use of 
information stored within a plaintiff’s system, such as customer details for targeted marketing 
purposes, or information on the plaintiff’s available products and services for market research 
and/or Web aggregation purposes. See also Hongwei Zhu, The Interplay of Web Aggregation and 
Regulations § 2.1 (MIT Sloan School of Management, Working Paper No. 4397-02, 2002, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=365061 (Last visited October. 23, 2003). 
74    200 WL 525390,  2001 US App Lexis 1454. 
75  John J. Cotter, Sean C. Ploen, Using and misusing third party resources, 661 PLI/Pat 213, 230. 
Westlaw. 
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 In contrast, in Register.com Inc., v Verio, Inc.,76 only evidence of “mere 
possessory interference” is needed to demonstrate the quantum of harm necessary to 
establish a claim for trespass to chattels.77 This indicates that in contrast to 
Ticketmaster, the amount of interference is not necessarily substantial, as the word 
“mere” connotes that the intermeddling involved must not be something that is 
substantial or comprehensive.78
In contrast to Ticketmasters and eBay which require a showing of actual or 
potential interference with the owner’s use of the system, the Court in Oyster 
Software, Inc. v Forms Processing, Inc,
  
79
 Taking the above discussions into account, it seems that the application by the 
courts relating to this element has always been uncertain. The Court in CompuServe 
did not consider this element as there was other element, i.e., harm, that had been 
successfully proven by the plaintiff. In a situation where the court considers this 
element to support trespass to chattel claim, a question on the degree of substantiality 
has not clearly been determined by the court in order to assess the necessary level of 
interference required in a trespass to chattel claim.
 rejected the argument that trespass could not 
be found if the interference is negligible. Here, all that was required is “use”. The 
Court in that case held that there was a potential trespass based on the use of robots to 
copy metatags from plaintiff’s site for use in defendant’s site. It was submitted that the 
Defendant’s conduct was sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass not 
because the interference was “substantial” but simply because the defendant’s conduct 
amounted to ‘use’ of plaintiff’s computer.   
80
                                               
76  126 F.Supp.2d 238, 249-250 (S.D.N.Y 2000), the court cited eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F.Supp. 2d 
at 1071 for that principle. 
77  John J. Cotter, Sean C. Ploen, Using and misusing third party resources, 236. 
78  In determining that “possessory interference” existed, the court gave weight to the following factors: 
      i. Testimony from Register.com’s technology officer that  if the “strain on Register.com’s 
resources…becomes strong enough, it could cause Register.com’s computer systems to malfunction 
or crash”; 
      ii. The technology officer’s believe that if Verio’s searching were allowed, “then every purveyor of 
Internet-based services would engage  in similar conduct”; 
iii. Verio’s testimony that it  saw “no need to place  a limit on the number of other companies that 
should be allowed to harvest data from Register.com’s computers”; 
iv. Verio’s awareness that its robot “could slow the response times of the registrar’s databases and even 
overload them”; 
v. Verio’s investigation into “cloaking the origin of its queries by using a process  called IP aliasing”. 
Ibid., 236-237.  
79  2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal.2001). 
 Due to the ambiguity of the 
80  eBay, Inc. v Bidder’s Edge, Inc, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.2000) (stating that to establish 
trespass to chattels, “intermeddling with  or use of another’s personal property “rather that “a 
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element of dispossession and substantial interference, the Courts seem to rely on other 
element such as harm in establishing trespass to chattel doctrine.  
 
iii. 
The element of harm has been commonly applied by the court in establishing the 
trespass to chattel doctrine.
Harm 
81 Harm as decided by the court in cyber trespass cases 
includes lowering advertisement page hit, reduction in consumer purchases, slowing 
down the computer system, diminishing the system resources, withdrawing server 
capacity and potential system shut down which diminishes the value of computer 
system82
 In CompuServe, Inc v. Cyber Promotions,
 
83 the Court held that Cyber 
Promotions  was liable to CompuServe  for trespass to chattels  under both § 218(b)84  
for committing harm resulting in the diminution of quality to possessor’s  personal 
property and  § 218(d)85  for committing  harm to one of possessor’s “legally 
protected interests”.86 The Defendant violated § 218(b) by  first, diminishing the value 
of CompuServe’s computer system to the extent that  Cyber promotions’ mass 
electronic  mailings demanded disk space  and processing power  from Plaintiff’s 
computer equipment and second, depriving those resources from serving CompuServe 
customers. The “legally protected interest” of  CompuServe was impaired  as  Cyber 
Promotions’ interference into CompuServe’s Computer system harmed Plaintiff’s 
business reputation and goodwill.87
                                                                                                                                       
substantial interference with possession” was all that was required),  Ticketmaster v. 
Ticketmaster.com, 200 WL 525390, 2001 US App Lexis 1454. (stating that the comparative use of 
ticketmaster’s website by Tickets.com was very small which had not shown that Tickets.com’s use  
interferes to any extent the regular business of Ticketmaster)  Register.com Inc., v. Verio  Inc., 126 
F.Supp.2d 238, 249-250 (S.D.N.Y 2000), (stating that only evidence of “mere possessory 
interference”  is needed to demonstrate the quantum of harm necessary to establish  a claim for 
trespass to chattels ). 
81 The element of “Harm” is provided in §218(d) of the Restatement  of Tort (Second) where it states 
that one who commits a trespass to a chattel may be committed intentionally if “… bodily harm is 
caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some  person or thing in which the possessor has a 
legally protected interest…” This element is discussed together with §218(b) which states that a 
trespass to chattel may occur if “…the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value…” 
This part is discussed simultaneously as “impairment” brings the same meaning as “harm’. 
82 CompuServe, Inc v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F.Supp.1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997), Intel Corporation v. 
Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944,(Cal.Super.Ct.Apr.28, 1999). 
83  962 F.Supp.1015 (S.D.Ohio 1997). 
84  Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
85  Ibid. 
86  962 F.Supp.1015 (S.D.Ohio 1997) at 1022-1023. 
87  Ibid.,at 1027-1028. 
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 The Court in Intel Corporation v. Hamidi,88 relying upon Thrifty-Tel and 
CompuServe ruled that “any impairment in the value to Intel of its email system is 
sufficient to show injury”.89 The element of harm was also derived from the fact that 
the Defendant’s trespass resulted in diminishing employees’ productivity and the 
devotion of company resources to message blocking efforts.90
 It is noted that, the element of “harm” could also include future harm. In eBay, 
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.,
 
91 the Court held that the risk of future harm92 caused by 
the Defendant and other entities that may potentially interfere with the plaintiff’s 
chattel is enough to support a trespass to chattel claim.93 This issue was evaluated on 
the “balance of harm” test.94 This evaluation weighs the relative hardships to the 
parties based on several factors of harm. Following this balancing test, the Court took 
the initiative to categorize eBays’s alleged factors of harm into two different types; 
“system harm” and “reputation harm”. System harm is the type of harm eBay might 
endure from a defendant’s unauthorized use of the software robot95 while reputational 
harm is the alleged result of a Defendant’s actions from misrepresentation of 
information.96
                                               
88  1999 WL 450944. at *1-*2 (Cal.Super.Ct.Apr.28,1999). In this case, Intel sued a private individual 
for sending email messages criticizing Intel’s employment practices to over 30,000 Intel employees 
at their business email addresses. 
89  Ibid., pg.t *2. 
90  Ibid. However in a sharply divided opinion, the narrow majority held that these claims did not state a 
proper claim of trespass to chattel. Some actual or threatened  harm to  the asset or property  must be 
shown to establish trespass. 
91  100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D.Cal.2000). 
92  The court held that  the web crawling performed by Bidder’s Edge has satisfied the element of 
damage or harm in trespass to chattel. Even though the spider programs use one percent of the total 
usage of  eBay’s servers, this did not cause any disruption of service. It did deny eBay the use  of 
that portion of its processing bandwith. In addition to that, allowing such copying would prompt 
other potential competitors to crawl eBay’s website. This threat of irreparable harm justified 
granting eBay an injunction. Ibid., pg. 1071-1072. 
93  The court stated that “…Bidder’s Edge’s ongoing violation  of eBay’s fundamental property right to 
exclude others from its computer system potentially causes sufficient irreparable harm to support a 
preliminary injuction…” Ibid.,at 1067. 
94  In its analysis, the court first discussed the parameters of granting preliminary injunctive relief by 
administering a two-part test i.e., “balance of harm” and “likelihood of success” test. 
95  System harm was evaluated based on the potential harm that might occur as a result of defendant’s 
action.  Ibid., pg. 1064-1065.  
96  However, the court declined to include the balance of harm analysis due to eBay’s failure to consider 
it as underlying claim. Ibid., pg. 1064. 
 It was submitted by the Court that if Bidder’s Edge was allowed to 
continue its hostile practices of web crawling, other companies might join in the foray 
and eventually cause harm to eBay. This would result in eBay suffering irreparable 
harm from lost of profits and customer goodwill. 
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 Following eBay’s decision, the Court in Register.com Inc., v Verio, Inc.97 
concluded that any future use of “a search robot to access the database” would exceed 
the scope of Register.com’s consent and amount to trespass to chattel.  The Court in 
that case was not reluctant to satisfy the trespass to chattels elements based on  very 
minimum levels of harm,98 as well as any other potential harm occurring  from 
additional software robots.99
As opposed  to the decision in Oyster and other cases that have decided on that 
matter, the Court in Ticketmaster denied the action of trespass brought by the  Plaintiff 
on the ground of lacking  sufficient harm. It was submitted that there was no proof   
that the use of robotic software to collect data from a site did result in proven damage 
to the system or proven denial of use for a significant period by the true owner. The 
Court further affirmed that a requirement of actual, substantial loss or damage was 
consistent with the common law concept of trespass to chattel, although some cases 
recognized that a number did not require substantial impairment.
 The Court cited CompuServe and eBay and states that: 
 
Although Register.com’s evidence of any burden or harm to its computer system caused by the 
successive queries performed by search robots is imprecise, evidence of mere possessory interference is 
sufficient to demonstrate the quantum of harm necessary to establish a claim for trespass to chattels. 
  
100
Traditional formulation requires substantial impairment or harm. In contrast, 
the court in cyber trespass cases submitted that any loss of value would satisfy the 
requirement of damage.
 
101
                                               
97  126 F.Supp.2d 238, 249-250 (S.D.N.Y 2000). 
98  In traditional trespass to chattels, the level of harm must rise beyond the trivial and be substantial 
enough to be equivalent to physical seizure or deprivation of use of enjoyment,  Marry Anne 
Bendotoff, Elizabeth R. Gosse, ‘Stay off my cyber property!”: trespass to chattel on the Internet’ 6 
Intell.Prop.L.Bull. 12 at 13. 
99  Ibit., at 241. Although Register.com estimated the amount of harm to a 2.3% diminishment of 
network resources, the court noted that  this amount although minimal, amounted to “some’ harm, 
thus meeting the elements  of trespass to chattel. Similar to  the eBay court, the Register.com court 
weighed the potential harm resulting from other software robots, if Verio’s software robot  was not 
stopped. 
100 Raymond T.Nimmer, The nature of property rights in information, information law, West 
Publication, USA, 2-48. 
101  See Dan L.Burk, ‘The Trouble With Trespass’ 4, J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27, at 35. It was 
suggested that “…Trivial interferences  never constitute a dispossession  but the harm necessary to 
trigger liability may arise from an injury to someone or something other than the chattel itself, so 
long as the harm bears a proximate relationship to the dispossession…”Ibid., pg. 28. 
 In other words, the level of harm required is very minimal. 
In certain cases, a trespass to chattel claim can even succeed without quite proof of 
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actual damage to computer system.102 Thus, it appears that in a trespass to chattels 
claims, the court disregarded the causation element, allowing the injunction based on 
harm to the system’s value, whether in the form of loss of the network’s value, loss of 
company resources or loss of good will.103 In such cases, the element of harm can 
arguably satisfied at the most trivial level.104
TRESPASS TO GOODS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND MALAYSIA 
 
 
It is observed that in common law cases relating to trespass to goods there are three 
elements emphasized by the courts that are, first, there must be intentional interference 
involved, secondly, the goods are in the possession of the claimant and finally, the 
existence of  interference. 
i. 
The act constituting the trespass must be either intentional
Intentional interference  
105 or negligent. The act of 
defendant, which was neither intentional nor negligent, is not liable in trespass to 
goods.106 The requisite intention is indicated from the act of interference with the 
chattels which is deliberate or willful. The intention need not be to interfere 
permanently with another’s goods.107
Yet another requirement to trespass is concerned with the channel of 
interference. There cannot be a trespass if the interference is indirect.
 This means that if the unauthorized access to the 
data in a database involves only insubstantial period of time, it does not exclude the 
intruder from liability under trespass to goods.  
108
                                               
102  In  Intel Corporation v Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944. at *1-*2 (Cal.Super.Ct.Apr.28,1999), one of the 
harms alleged was loss of employee productivity. 
103  Marry Anne Bendotoff, Elizabeth R. Gosse, ‘Stay off my cyber property!: trespass to chattel on the  
Internet’,  pg. 16. 
104  Ibid. 
105  For unintended trepassory contacts there is a liability in the absence of negligence. John G.Fleming, 
The Law of Torts, 9th Edition, LBC, at 59. 
106  In National Coal Board v. J E Evans and Co (Cardiff) Ltd [1951] 2 KB at 861, the Court of Appeal 
held that a contractor whose employee, while excavating, damaged the cable of the plaintiff and 
whose act was neither intentional nor negligent was not liable in trespass to goods. He operated the 
machine which was excavating the earth, but he neither desired nor ought to have foreseen that 
damage to the cable which constituted the tortuous invasion of the plaintiff’s interest, his act, 
therefore, was neither intentional nor negligent. R.P Balkin, J.L.R. Davis, Law of Torts, 
Butterworths, 2nd Edn., 1996, pg. 101. 
107  Ibid., pg. 100. Thus the unauthorized borrowing of a car in order to take it on joyride with the 
ultimate intention of returning it to is owner is still a trespass, Schemmell v. Pomeroy (1989) 50 
SASR 450. 
108  Hartley v. Moxham (1842) 3 QB  701. 
 The 
interference must be through the direct act which causes immediate contact with the 
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claimant’s goods. It was submitted that direct interference must be physical in 
nature.109 This will bring to a consideration whether or not trespass to data in 
cyberspace is regarded as physical, and thus, direct. It is submitted that trespass to 
chattel may be committed by any act which brings the defendant into contact with the 
chattel. This includes the act of destroying, damaging110 or merely using goods111 or 
removing an article112 from one place to another.113
Nevertheless, in some cases actual contact is not required.  This means that 
although the interference was not actually completed, for example in a situation where 
someone is about to interfere with the goods,
  
114
ii. 
 it is, in spite of everything, considered 
as an act of trespassing. It seems that even though trespass to goods requires contact to 
physical property, it is not necessary that the contact is physical. As an analogy, to 
computer or online database, the act of sending spam email or an attempt to 
unauthorized access the database content in a computer server or hard disk can be 
regarded as trespass even though no real touching to the computer server or disk was 
occurred. Thus, the requirement of physical property is represented in the physical 
part of computer disk as hardware, since no actual interference is necessary in 
establishing trespass to chattel, the intention to trespass as exemplified in the act of 
sending spam email or the act of unauthorized access to data has been complied with 
the element of intentional interference. 
 
Trespass to goods, like trespass to land, is essentially a harm to possession and 
not to ownership. Therefore,   the claimant in trespass to goods claim must have been 
in actual possession at the time of the interference complained of.
Possession / Dispossession of Property 
115
                                               
109  Norchaya Talib, Law of torts in Malaysia,  Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd Edn.,  2003, pg. 47- 48. 
110  Fouldes v. Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540 at 549, 151 ER 1153 at 1156. 
111  Penfolds Wines v. Elliot (1946) 74 CLR 204 at 214-215. For example driving a car, riding a horse  
or filling a bottle. 
112  Kirk v. Gregory (1876) 1 Ex D 55. 
113  John G Fleming, The Law of Torts, Ninth Edition,LBC, at 58. 
114  Ibid., For example chasing a chattel( Farmer v. Hunt (1610) 1 Brownl 220; 123 ER 766), throwing 
poison baits to dogs and the laying of baits (Hutchins v. Moughan [1947] VLR 131). 
115  Ward v, Macauley, (1791) 4 T.R. 489, Keenan Bros. Ltd v. C.I.E (1962) 97 I.L.T.R . 54 where it 
was decided that even an owner of goods may be liable in trespass if he seizes those goods from 
one who has lawful possession o them, e.g., as a bailee. 
 As noted by 
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Dixon J. in Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v. Elliott116 “… trespass is a wrong to possession 
…”.117
Possession connotes both the power of exercising physical control over the 
goods
 
118  and the intention to exercise such control on one’s own behalf.119 Any 
possession is sufficient provided that it is complete and unequivocal.120
 It is an established principle that moving of goods, also known as 
“asportation”, is considered as dispossession. As decided in Kirk v. Gregory,
  
121 a 
woman who moved rings belonging to a man who had just died from one room in his 
house to another, was held liable for trespass to goods. Therefore, the act of moving 
data through copying from one website to another without authorization may amount 
to dispossession. However, this is not necessarily so, as in certain circumstances 
particularly when no harm occurs, asportation is not regarded as dispossession.122
The principles from decided cases seem to show however, that, an act 
involving neither asportation nor dispossession could amount to a trespass to goods. 
This position was described in Everitt v. Martin
 
123
                                               
116  (1946) 74 CLR 204 at 224. The plaintiff s made and sold wine in their own bottles. Their name was 
printed on the bottles and it was also printed that the bottles belonged to them. The defendant who 
was a hotel proprietor sold wine in bulk to his hotel guests. The guests brought their own bottles 
and among the bottles brought, were those of the plaintiffs’. The plaintiff sought for an injunction 
claiming that the defendant was trespassing on their goods. The Court denied an injunction and 
said  that no trespass had occurred as the plaintiffs did not have possession in fact of the bottles. 
117 In the early case of Johnson v. Diprose, (1893) 1 QB, 512, Lord Esher described the notion of 
possession in the following terms: 
“…the plaintiff in an action of trespass must at the time of trespass have the present 
possession of the goods, either actual or constructive, or a legal right to the immediate 
possession…” 
In other words, an owner who is not in possession at the date of the alleged trespass cannot sue for 
trespass as the question of whether the claimant is the owner is immaterial. Therefore, a cyclist who 
parks his or her bicycle outside the shop remains in possession of it, however, if a thief rides away 
on it the thief then has the possession despite  obtaining it wrongfully. R. P Balkin, J. L. R. Davis, 
Law of torts, pg. 101. 
118 Sajan Singh v. Sardara Ali [1960] 26 MLJ  52 at 57. Thomson C.J. “…It was essential  for the 
plaintiff to show that he had the right  to immediate possession of the lorry at the time of 
commencing the action…”   
119  R. P Balkin, J. L. R. Davis, Law of torts, pg. 100. A bailee can sue in trespass to goods.  
120  R. Ratanlal, K. T. Dhirajlal, The law of torts, Wadhwa, 24th Edn., pg. 419. 
121  (1876) 1 Ex D 55. 
122  An example of this situation is  where a person in gently reversing his car touches the bumper of 
another car, the brake of which has not been applied and without damaging it cause it to move a 
few feet. In that case, he does not dispossess the owner’s car, even though he has asported it. R.P 
Balkin, J. L. R. Davis, Law of torts, pg. 99. 
123  [1953] NZLR 298. 
 which dealt with an issue whether a 
person could commit an act of trespass by allowing his coat to come into contact with 
another person’s car. It was decided by Adams J. that there was a right of action of 
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trespass in the act of   mere touching of another’s good without damage or asportation, 
provided that the act involves intentional contact.124
If the act is intentional, the elements of dispossession and harm do not 
necessarily exist in order to establish trespass to goods. If the interference was 
negligently committed, the element of harm or dispossession must exist to constitute 
trespass. 
 
 
iii. 
It is most likely that a trespass to goods will involve a harmful contact with some 
other object of varying degrees of injury. As in common law principle, a trespass to 
chattels is actionable per se without any proof of actual damage.
Harm 
125  Hence, indirect 
harm is acceptable. Any unauthorized touching or moving of a chattel is actionable at 
the suit of the possessor of it, even though no harm ensues. This act of trespass would 
include erasing a tape recording or showing126 a private letter to an unauthorized 
person.127
 In addition to that, the element of damage in trespass to goods need not be 
material or lasting.
 Thus, it is inferred that an act of sending spam email to one server, which 
result in monopolizing valuable server time while simultaneously slowing down 
connection speeds, and the unauthorized access of and copying of data or information 
from one web site or online database will definitely come under the protection of 
trespass to goods. Despite an absence of the element of actual harm, such acts of 
sending spam email and unauthorized access and copying data have caused substantial 
reputation and economic damage to the owner. 
128
                                               
124  However, he had no hesitation to declare that there would be no right  of action in the case of 
merely accidental contact where no damage is done. For further support that mere touching is not 
trespass, see Wilson v. Marshall [1982] Tas SR 287 at 299-300 per Cox J (FC).  
125  Leitch & Co. v. Leydon [1931] A.C. 90, 106; Penfolds Wines Pty. Ltd. v. Elliot (1946) 74 C.L.R 
204, 214-215. 
126  R.F.V. Heuston, Salmond on the law  of torts, pg. 92. 
127  As distinct  from merely  looking at the letter as it was a view of Lord Camden C.J. that “…The eye 
cannot by the laws of England  be guilty of a trespass… “as decided in Entick v. Carrington (1765) 
19 St.Tr.1030, 1066. 
128  R.P Balkin, J.L.R. Davis, Law of torts, pg. 99. To beat a dog  may also be an act of trespass, Wright 
v. Ramscot (1665) 1 Wms Saund 183. 
 Therefore, the damage done to the server need not necessarily 
be substantial. It is sufficient if the spam emails cause insubstantial moment of 
interruption to the computer system as well as a minimal loss of profit to the database 
owner. 
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 It seems from the above, the requirements needed to establish trespass to 
goods/chattel in the common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and 
Malaysia, are somehow similar to what is available in the United States. The United 
States jurisprudence has developed and expanded the doctrine of trespass to chattel 
further to cover the intangible nature of goods, such as database content. In common 
law jurisdictions, similar conclusion could be made, through judicial activism. 
 
THE SHORTCOMING IN CYBER TRESPASS NOTION 
The existing element of a trespass to chattels appears to be in line with the cyber 
trespass issues. Nevertheless, it is observed that there have been misapplications of 
those old rules to fit the new   cases. Let us look at them in turn.  
On the issue of “physical interference”, the court in cyber-trespass cases found 
that the digital signals from phone calls were sufficient to establish physical contact 
by analogizing to cases where dust particles and sound waves established a trespass 
claim.129 Recognition of electronic signals as a trespass has eliminated the 
requirement for a physical trespass and recognizes intangibles electrons as adequate to 
support a trespass to chattels claim130 However, in arriving to that point the court 
relied upon trespass to land cases and not trespass to chattels cases.131 The new cyber 
trespass to chattels has married the doctrines of trespass to land and trespass to 
chattels, blurring the traditional boundaries between them.132 It is observed that the 
reasoning of the court is not necessarily well grounded in the bases of trespass law, 
thus the court’s conclusion that signal sent over telephone wires are sufficiently 
tangible to effect a trespass may not be trustworthy precedent.133
                                               
129  Thrifty-Tel, Inc v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 472-473 (Cal. Ct. App.1996). 
130  Laura Quilter, ‘The continuing expansion of cyberspace trespass to chattels’ 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
421 at 439. 
131  Although the land-chattels distinction may seem minor, it reverses several hundred years of legal 
evolutions collapsing the separate doctrines of trespass to land and trespass to chattel back into 
their single common law progenitor the action of trespass. Dan L. Burk, ‘The trouble with trespass’ 
4. J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27, at 33. 
132  Trespass to land and trespass to chattels protect two different interests. Trespass to land requires a 
far lesser degree of contact than trespass to chattels to give rise to liability. This distinction perhaps 
indicates that  the courts  intention to grant  a greater degree of protection to land. Therefore by 
applying  the similar concept to trespass to chattel as trespass to land, the courts tend to ignore the 
policy justifications underlying each. Ibid. 
133  Marry Anne Bendotoff, Elizabeth R.Gosse, ‘Stay off my cyber property!: trespass to chattel on the 
Internet’, 6 Intell.Prop.L.Bull. 12 at 15. 
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A question that arises here is if the principle is to be accepted; to what extent is 
it applicable to other types of unsolicited communication of electronic signals such as 
via telephone call or fax message? 134  Is it also applicable to the act of trespassing by 
unwanted television and radio broadcasts and through household appliances attached 
to an outlet?135 It is noted that to conclude that electronic signals can constitute 
trespass to chattel may be absurd as it seems very unconvincing to satisfy the physical 
contact element of trespass to chattel.136 By misconstruing what is fundamentally a 
communication technology via websites as real property or even chattel property, the 
courts have granted the owners of publicly-accessible Internet servers an absolute 
right to exclude that does not apply to any other communication medium, such as 
television and telephone. An owner merely has to withdraw permission for use to be 
deemed harmful and trespassory and therefore subject to remedies.137
If electronic signals can be regarded as physical interference, this brings into 
issue the Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) liability. If a user sends a robotic spider to 
ISP A, this will involve numerous servers that carry signals along the way before 
reaching ISP A’s server. In this case trespass to chattels may expose many ISPs and 
intermediaries to liability.
  
138
 It seems that mere possessory interference is needed and only a minimum level 
of harm is necessary to establish a claim for trespass to chattels. However, § 218 
Restatement of Torts requires a greater degree of impairment for such action. 
Therefore the court should only allow a claim that demonstrates damage to the servers 
as well as increased customers’ complaints.
 
139 This fact should be supported with 
evidence that the activity of a trespasser caused these server problems and expert 
evidence to prove such claims. Even though the harm caused need not be substantial, 
the courts should require a noticeable impairment on the performance of their 
equipment to satisfy the trespass to chattel claims.140
 The element of harms as stipulated in the Restatement could either be in the 
form of economic or physical harm. On the other hand, a trespass to land does not 
 
                                               
134  Ibid. 
135  R.Clifton Merrell, ‘Trespass to chattels in the age of the Internet’ 80 Wash.U.L.Q. 675 at 688. 
136  Ibid. 
137  Ibid. 
138  Ibid.,pg. 690. For these reasons, the case law developed in trespass to chattels before Thrifty Tel’s 
case did not allow for particulate trespass. 
139  Instead of allowing simply one or two percent processing time to qualify for impairment 
140  Ibid., pg. 691-692. 
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require that element and allow for nominal damages. It is submitted that this justified 
the fact that other intangible harm, such as smoke and particulate matters, may satisfy 
the requirement in trespass to chattels claim.141  The actual harm that spam or spiders 
caused to the servers has rarely been calculated142 and the use of available computer 
resources has rarely been found sufficient to constitute harm. In short, cyber trespass 
to chattels seems to avoid the harm requirement which is a strict formulation of a 
property right143
 It is obvious from the relevant decided cases that the trespassers did not 
dispossess the owners of the equipment or their property in anyway. In those cases, 
the equipment was contacted by electrons and was not damaged, removed or render 
inoperable.
 as in the realm of communication and network technologies this strict 
formulation creates absurd results. 
144 Moreover, even if electrons are regarded as tangible, physical property, 
it is hard to imagine substantial interference with electrons that causes such a result in 
practice.145 As a matter of fact, some courts have found trespass to chattel in relation 
to computer systems on the basis of relatively minor amount of interference, including 
electrons flowing through a system  and inconvenience to  plaintiff’s customers from 
unwanted spam. Most of these cases dealt with the defendants making unauthorized 
interruption into plaintiff’s systems to gain some kind of commercial advantage such 
as taking customers details for targeted marketing purposes or information on the 
plaintiff’s available products or services for market research or web aggregation 
purposes. The judges tend to bend and stretch existing trespass to chattel theory to 
protect the information or database under the guise of protecting the website as if it 
were a real place.146
Moreover, as the cyberspace trespass to chattels doctrine has been expanded, 
the requirement for harm has been practically receded which to allow application of 
  
                                               
141  Ibid, pg. 689. 
142  Ibid., This may be because the harm to servers is difficult to measure or if measured, would seem 
insignificant or slight . 
143  Laura Quilter, ‘The continuing expansion of cyberspace trespass to chattels’ pg. 440.  
144  Dan L. Burk, ‘The trouble with trespass’ 4 J.Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27 at 34. It is nearly 
impossible to recognize trespass to chattels in Thrifty Tel or CompuServe, since the owners of the 
equipment were not in anyway dispossessed of its use by the passage of electrons through the 
equipment in exactly  the way the equipment was designed to carry them. 
145  Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Mixed metaphors in cyberspace: property in information and information 
systems’ pg.  242. 
146  Ibid., pg. 243. 
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unclear, attenuated and indirect harms.147 In extending the doctrine of trespass to 
chattel, the courts have allowed various novel and indirect harms which include loss 
of corporate good will, alleged psychological distress suffered from reading email and 
the time wasted by employees.148 Beside that, the element of harms “occurred’ is not 
necessarily confined to harm actually suffered by the server, but it has been extended 
to potential harms. Thus, the courts turn to a new approach of recognizing indirect and 
speculative harms. However, this approach has removed a vital limit of the doctrine, 
i.e., a connection between the alleged harm and the remedy imposed.149
 As the threshold of ‘trespass to chattels’ has deviated from its traditional 
requirements, the doctrine turns to be impressionable, where the principle is easily 
influenced by the circumstances of the case and able to fit any and all situations. In 
other words, cyber- trespass to chattel is on its way to becoming the “cure-all” remedy 
for unwanted Internet contacts. With this new definition of trespass to chattel plus the 
novel interpretation of harm, which indirectly strip-off the harm requirement, it would 
be difficult not to conceive of anything that might not constitute trespass to chattels. In 
other words, trespass to chattels at present, is defined purely at the owner’s will and 
can include almost any kind of act.
 
150 By altering and to a certain extent removing  
some of the requirements, i.e., harm, the courts have created an absolute property right 
which is similar to trespass to land,151 but without fully analyzing the potential 
consequences of their rulings.152
 It is suggested that to solve these problems the courts should continue using 
cyber trespass theory but require claimants to demonstrate either, actual and tangible 
harm was done to the chattel, or the chattels’ value to the plaintiff was substantially 
diminished. It is difficult to satisfy the element of tangible harm, in the case of 
database as there is no actual taking involved and the equipment is not damaged. 
 
                                               
147  Laura Quilter, ‘The continuing expansion of cyberspace trespass to chattels’ pg. 439. 
148  Ibid., See Intel  v. Hamidi, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 (Ct .Appeal .2001). 
149  Ibid., pg. 440. 
150  Ibid., pg. 441. As in the  dissenting judgment of Kolkey J. in  Intel v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 
at 262 (Ct. App. 2001) even lovers’ quarrels could turn into trespass suits by reason of the receipt 
of unsolicited letters or calls from the jilted lover. Imagine what happens after the angry lover tells 
her fiancé not to call again and violently hangs up the phone. Fifteen minutes later the phone rings. 
Her fiancé wishing to make up. No, trespass to chattel. 
151  As contrast to cyber-trespass theory, trespass to land  is ruled through the limiting doctrines and 
balances of real property law. Ibid.  
152  Edward Chang, ‘Bidding on trespass: Ebay Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and the abuse of trespass 
theory in cyberspace law’  29 AIPLA Q.J. 445, at 464. 
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However, the value of database may be diminished as a free riding of the content of 
database may cause economic loss as well as reputational harm to the database owner.  
 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF   UNJUST ENRICHMENT  
 
The common law principle of unjust enrichment is one of the possible actions in 
combating the act of free riding of database. This cause of action focuses on the 
question of how the common law obligations should seek to regulate the commercial 
exploitation of informational products. This is important when the database stands 
outside the existing intellectual property regime such as copyright.  
 
The Definitions  
In English Law, the recognition of the concept of unjust enrichment has been 
controversial.153  Unjust enrichment has been dealt with by the English Court by 
referring to quasi-contract, implied contract and constructive trust. Hence, relief that 
was granted was based on equity or tort, not unjust enrichment. English law does not 
also mention the principle of unjust enrichment directly, but discusses it under the 
head of remedy of restitution.154 In other common law countries like Australia, the 
logical vehicle for protection of database cases employed is unjust enrichment. 
However, even in Australia, there still is much confusion over what actually amounts 
to unjust enrichment.155
 Unjust enrichment is defined as “… the unjust obtaining of money benefits at 
the expense of the claimant …”
 
156
                                               
153  This is due to the lack of a systematic approach towards unjust enrichment, furthermore the absence 
of the influence of Roman law and the structure  of English law have contributed to hesitation in 
adopting the principle of unjust enrichment. Besides that, the application of principles of contract 
to quasi-contractual obligation, where in English law, tort, agreement or presumed agreement 
remains the basis for obligation, adding to the difficulty of accepting a general principle of unjust 
enrichment . Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Unfair competition law: the protection of intellectual 
and industrial creativity, Colerendon Press, 1997, pg. 131. 
154  Ibid., pg. 131-132. 
155 Brian F.Fitzgerald, ‘Protecting informational products including databases through unjust 
enrichment: an australian perspective’ [1998] 1 No. 7  E.I.P.R 247. 
156  L.B Curzon, Dictionary of Law, ILBS, Kuala Lumpur,  6th Edn., 2003, pg. 436. 
 In principle, it is a generic conception which 
describes the causative event of loss of value by the plaintiff and acquisition of that 
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value by the defendant in circumstances that are unjust.157 It is a general principle of 
justice which has unconsciously guided the legislature in their enactment of laws and 
the courts  in their past pronouncements for it is inconceivable that any system of law 
would  allow one person to retain a measurable gain  that is the product of another’s 
loss.158
 As described above, unjust enrichment has also been recognized in some 
jurisdictions, as the law of restitutions. Restitution can be defined as the area of law 
concerned with relieving a defendant of wealth, which in the eyes of the law, he 
should not be entitled to retain.
  
159 While, the term, “the law  of restitution”160 
describes that  area of the private law of obligations that is concerned with restoring 
the plaintiff’s wealth,  of whatever sort, where the transfer of the asset representing 
that wealth, while effective for the purposes of the law of contract and the law of 
property, ought nevertheless to be undone or reversed.161 Restitutionary claims are to 
be found in equity as well as law.162 This law is relating to all claims, quasi 
contractual or otherwise which are founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment.163
 The application of different terminology, i.e., unjust enrichment or restitution  
for the same cause of action does not affect the purpose of that legal principle which is 
to prevent the act of free riding and to restore the plaintiff of the benefit received by 
the defendant  in unjust circumstances. It was submitted that restitution was a response 
 
                                               
157 Brian F.Fitzgerald, ‘Protecting informational products including databases through unjust 
enrichment: an australian perspective’ pg. 248. 
158  Varsha L.Doshi,  Restitutionary remedies in illegal agreements, Malayan Law Journal, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1998, pg. 1. 
159  Professor Andrew Tettenborn, Law of restitution in England and Ireland, Cavendish Publishing 
Ltd, London, 2nd Edn., 1996, pg. 1. 
160  The law of restitution is the body of law concerned with claims for the reversal of unjust 
enrichment, the prevention of one who has committed a wrong from profiting from it, the 
restoration of a claimant’s property right adversely affected by defendant’s action and the 
restitutionary remedies.  
161  Ross B Grantham, Charles E.F Rickett, Enrichment and restitution  in New Zealand, Hart 
Publishing, 2000, pg. 5. 
162  Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 3rd Edn., 1986, pg. 3. 
163  Lord Wright in his speech had admitted that a properly worked-out law of unjust enrichment is 
needed in every civilized system. His Lordship further described the principle as: 
        “…The general title restitution is well chosen but may need explanation. It indicates the essential 
feature of this branch of law, which distinguishes it from the other main branches. Restitution is 
not covered with damages, or compensation for breach of contract or for torts, but with remedies 
for, what, if not remedied, would constitute an unjust benefit or advantage to the defendant at the 
expense of the plaintiff. Hence, (to state the matter very broadly ) an action for restitution is not 
primarily based  on loss to the plaintiff but on benefit which is enjoyed by the defendant at the cost 
of the plaintiff, and which it is unjust for the defendant to retain…” Lord Wright of Durley, ‘Legal: 
essays and addresses’ (Cambridge CUP, 1939), 34-65 reprinted from (1937) 51 Harvard LR 369-
383). Also see Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] A.C 32. 
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to the event of unjust enrichment; in fact the only response to that event, but it was 
also a response to other event.164
THE THRESHOLD OF PROTECTION  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
In applying the concept of unjust enrichment, the elements which must be established 
are: 
a. Unjustness; 
b. Enrichment of the defendant; and 
c. At the expense of  the plaintiff by subtraction from the plaintiff or by 
doing wrong to the plaintiff. 
i. Element of “Unjust” 
 In order to succeed in a claim, the plaintiff must prove a principle ground for 
recovery of unjust factor. To determine “unjustness”, one must inquire into these two 
rationales,   vitiated intent or qualified intent. The former occurs in a situation where 
the plaintiff never intended to transfer the benefit to the defendant in the first place. 
On the other hand, the latter depends on the purpose of transferring the value, if the 
purpose of transfer of value failed, the plaintiff’s intent to transfer the value also failed 
as exemplified in  mistake (including ignorance), duress,  legal compulsion, 
necessitous intervention and total failure of consideration.165
 A challenging issue here is to apply this unjust factor, to a situation where 
there has been an unauthorized taking of a valuable tangible, for example, the content 
of database. It is submitted that, in order to prove that the act of unauthorized taking or 
copying the content of database is unjust, the valuable intangibles taken, i.e., the 
database content or information, should not move to the defendant through voluntary 
and fair transaction, in other words, which is vitiated or qualified.
  
166
                                               
164  William Swadling, What is the law of restitution about? Four Categorical Errors, in W.R Cornish, 
Richard Nolan, Janet O’Sullivan and Graham Virgo (eds.) Restitution past, present and future: 
essays in honour  of Gareth Jones, Hart, Oxford, 1998, pg. 331. 
165  There are other examples of recognized categories of unjust factors which are not included under  
vitiated or qualified intent, that are free acceptance, illegality, unauthorized payments out of 
consolidated revenue and ultra vires demand by a public authority. These categories are based 
largely on policy considerations rather than plaintiff’s intent or defendant’s conduct. 
166  Peter Birks, An introduction to the law of restitution, Oxford University Press, 1989, pg. 141 and 
219. 
 In cases such as 
unauthorized taking or copying of database content, the unjust factor should be 
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conceptualized as the unauthorized taking of a valuable intangible in a competitive 
market based on the principle of vitiated intent to transfer value.167 This is based on 
the grounds that if the database content is taken without authorization, then it is likely 
that the plaintiff never possessed the requisite intent to transfer the information to the 
defendant.168
ii. Element of “Enrichment of the Defendant” 
 
In order to succeed in a restitutionary claim, the plaintiff has to establish that he has 
conferred a “benefit” on the defendant. This requirement has two aspects, first, that 
the defendant has received a benefit and, second, that the benefit has enriched the 
defendant. As discussed above, it is not necessary to prove that defendant has received 
possession of property. It is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has 
been enriched by some kind of benefit or gain. 
 What amounts to gain or benefit? As mentioned by Andrew Tettenborn:169
It is also submitted that the meaning of term benefit would invariably be 
depending on the circumstances of each individual case. As set out by Palmer,
  
 
…But in this part of the law “gain” is a very wide term. It includes, it is suggested, anything amounting 
to benefit which has or might have money value to the person that accesses it… 
 
170
 Once it is proven that the defendant received an identifiable benefit 
quantifiable in monetary terms, it is the right of the plaintiff to recover his 
restitutionary claim.
 
benefit has two important meanings, first, where there has been an addition to the 
defendant’s wealth, and second, where a performance requested for by the defendant 
has been rendered. 
171
                                               
167 Brian F.Fitzgerald, ‘Protecting informational products including databases through unjust 
enrichment: an Australian perspective’ pg. 250. 
168  Professor Birks has grouped the act of unauthorized taking of value under unjust factor called 
“ignorance”. However, it is submitted that the position should be labeled as “unauthorized taking” 
rather than “ignorance” as there may be the existence of knowledge but no authorization. Ibid.,9. 
169  Andrew Tettenborn, Law of restitution, Cavendish Publishing, 1993, pg. 2. 
170  Palmer, GE, The law of restitution, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1978, pg. 44-45. 
171 Brian F.Fitzgerald, ‘Protecting informational products including databases through unjust 
enrichment: an Australian perspective’ pg. 253. 
 The burden to prove that the defendant has benefited lies on 
the plaintiff. It is the defendant’s task to prove otherwise, that he was not in fact 
enriched by using restitutionary defence.  
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 In an unjust enrichment claim, it is important to establish, first, what is value 
and second, how a plaintiff proves a link to the value.172 If the valuable intangibles 
such as information in database can be bought and sold in the market, the objective 
market mechanism will determine value.173
iii.  “At the expense of the plaintiff by subtraction from the plaintiff” 
 
The next question is whether this enrichment was at the plaintiff’s expense. Thus, 
where a defendant has been unjustly enriched, it will be of no consequence to the 
plaintiff unless it occurred at the plaintiff’s expense. Enrichment at the plaintiff’s 
expense occurs in three situations. First, the plaintiff being in possession of a benefit 
confers it to defendant, second, when the defendant takes a benefit from the plaintiff’s 
possession and third, when a third party confers it on the defendant.174
In a database case, usually the benefit comes in the form of monetary value. 
The defendant might use the plaintiff’s data to create a competing database where he 
will gain benefit from it. In proving the element of “at the expense”, the plaintiff is 
required to demonstrate that the defendant’s unauthorized taking of the plaintiff’s 
database content will give benefit to the defendant. 
 In other words, 
enrichment is said to be at the plaintiff’s expense when the circumstances are such that 
the plaintiff would have certainly been the recipient of the benefit if not for the 
defendant’s interception of the benefit by the defendant. 
 To comply with the element of “at the expense”, it is necessary for the plaintiff 
to establish benefit, gain or value as well as to show that there is a causal link between 
the value-adding performed by plaintiff and the benefit or gain extracted by the 
defendant. Once a benefit has been identified in the hands of the defendant, the 
plaintiff needs to show a relationship with the value and the causal link between that 
value and the benefit or gain received by the defendant. 
In an action of unjust enrichment in database cases, the element of competitive 
market is necessary. This is because it justifies the value of the value-added 
                                               
172  This is because an action in unjust enrichment do not necessarily require that plaintiff possesses a 
proprietary right. Ibid., pg. 10. 
173  Mason and Carters observed that: 
“…Australian cases establish a general principle that if services have a market value as services,  the 
performance  of those services can count as benefit which… may found a claim in restitution for 
unjust enrichment…”. Mason.K and Carter J.W, Restitution in Australia, Butterworth, 1995, pg. 
304. 
174  Varsha, Restitutionary remedies in illegal agreements,  pg. 113. 
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information in the database. As decided in Board of Trade v Dow Jones,175 the unfair 
competition act is resulted from the proximity of the plaintiff to the commercial or 
market value of information. The privity of commercial value is indicated by the act 
of plaintiff in creating the value in the database content through fast delivery, hard 
work176
 In this sense, the examination of unfair competition criterion is considered in 
the requirement of unjust enrichment principle. In other words, if there is unjust 
enrichment, there must inevitably be unfairness in competition in the market. The act 
of misappropriation or unauthorized taking from another in order to receive an 
advantage in unjust circumstances will lead to the reduction of incentive in the value-
added product of the database owner.
 and creativity. Due to that reason the plaintiff owns the right to the added 
value which he has brought to the information or database content. Therefore, the 
plaintiff is entitled to seek for remedy of restitution for the act of unauthorized taking 
or misappropriation of the value added in the database.  
177
CONCLUSION 
 Therefore, the commercial exploitation by 
unauthorized taking the content of database can be considered as amalgamation of the 
act of unjust enrichment and unfair competition which give the right of restitutionary 
remedy  to the database owner . 
 
 
The trespass to chattel doctrine was used in database cases to prevent access to the 
information contained in it. The right at issue here is the right of access to the 
information   but not to reproduce, distribute or other rights as stipulated in copyright 
law. In other words, the theory of trespass to chattel is designed to protect against 
unauthorized interruptions that result in some harms to the physical item that are being 
trespassed upon or to the function of that item. Therefore, the intention of trespass to 
chattel doctrine does not actually protect the theft of copying of data. To make the 
trespass to chattels theory applicable to protect databases, the key element here is the 
act of copying must be harmful to the computer system physically or cause some 
damage to its function. Thus, if the harm is not directly related to an actual 
                                               
175  456 N.E 2d 84 (1983). 
176 Brian F. Fitzgerald, ‘Protecting informational products including databases through unjust 
enrichment: an Australian perspective’  pg. 252. 
177  Ibid. 
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impairment of the systems or websites, the trespass to chattels theory would arguably 
be applicable. 
Unlike the above, the doctrines of unjust enrichment is indirectly related to the 
principle of unfair competition. This is due to the fact that the law is used to prevent 
dishonest trade practices; i.e., free riding activities.  Although these actionable tort 
action is not essentially bound to the principle of unfair competition as such, it appears 
from the claims in the tort action that the element of unfair competition is needed.178
Email : 
  
 In conclusion, there are two possible approaches in protecting database under 
the common law torts in Malaysia. The first approach is through the common law 
doctrine of trespass to chattel/goods. Although, this doctrine is initially used to 
prevent access to database content, but not to protect from theft of data, an action can 
be taken under this tort if the act is harmful to the function of the computer system. 
The second approach is through the doctrine of unjust enrichment. This is particularly 
important, in a case, whereby, the wrongful action comes from the free riding 
activities by the competitors. 
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178  Unjust enrichment requires the element of “unjust” to be established which indicates unfair 
competition element. 
